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Abstract—MicroGrids (MGS) are foreseen as a building block
of the smart grid. They allow for the integration of distributed
energy resources and storage within the conventional grid.
This is partly possible through deployment of Information and
Communication Technologies (ICTS) within these structures.
Therefore cyber security is a major concern for MGS. This paper
investigates cyber-physical security aspects of the MG, including
vulnerabilities and threat landscape. A cyber-physical security
risk assessment is presented for evaluating impacts of exploiting
existing vulnerabilities by potential threats on MG operations.
Keywords—Microgrid, cyber-physical security, vulnerability,
threat landscape, risk
I. INTRODUCTION
The MGS group Distributed Energy Resources (DERS),
energy storage devices and loads within restricted geographic
area and present them as a single controllable entity to the
utility grid. They can operate connected or islanded to/from
the main grid whenever required by physical or economic con-
ditions. This concept allows effective integration of DERS at
distribution level. In fact, individual DERS are too small to be
granted access to the energy market. Likewise power utilities
are unable to effectively control and manage small DERS.
Moreover, MGS have the potential to integrate large quantities
of renewable generation through highly localized optimization
of distributed generation output, demand flexibility and storage
assets. These control and automation systems are supported by
massive integration of ICT within the MG and to the utility
grid. This comes with new challenges especially for cyber-
security. In fact, all these features act to increase the entry
points to the system and thus its exposure to cyber-threats.
The work presented in this paper investigates cyber-
physical security aspects of the MG. The remainder of this
paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the conecpt
of MG as a cyber-physical system. Then, in section III,
we discuss MG threat landscape through a vulnerabilities,
threats and threat agents analysis. In section IV, we present
a detailed analysis of potential attacks and thier impacts on
MG operations and we review some good practices to be used
in order to minimize risks. Finally, section V concludes the
paper.
II. SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
A cyber-physical system is co-engineered interacting net-
works of physical and computational components [1]. The
main task of the system is accomplished by its physical part,
whereas the cyber part is the enabler for smarter services to
maximize the system efficiency. The MG can be identified as
a cyber-physical system. The physical system is the power
infrastructure, while the cyber system is composed of the
control, automation and communication infrastructure. In the
following, we describe MG subsystems.
Fig. 1: Basic structure of a microgrid
A. MicroGrid (MG) as a Power System
From physical perspectives, a MG is a distributed electric
power system. It is formed by the aggregation of geographi-
cally localized distributed energy resources that are controlled
to provide end-users with predefined load profiles and power
quality and reliability. These resources could be renewable or
non-renewable power sources, storage, electric vehicles, loads,
etc. There are no conceptual restrictions on interconnections
between components within the MG and any technically
feasible connections between sources loads and storage are
allowed. MGS could be built to operate in either islanded,
grid-connected or both modes. For the connected MG, the
number of connection points to the utility grid varies although
a common connection point is commonly used. Remains that
the whole system is presented to the main grid as a single
controlled entity. Figure 1 shows the basic structure of a MG.
B. Microgrid Cyber system
MGS should provide reliable electric service when con-
nected to the main power grid, when operating in islanded
mode, and during the transition between these two modes [2].
This is accomplished using efficient control, automation and
communication that are realized by the its cyber-system.
Figure 2 presents a layered architecture of the MG high-
lighting its cyber-physical aspect. Components of MG physical
system, presented at the component layer, are locally controlled
by control and automation devices, sensors and actuators
presented at the local control layer (e.g. Smart Meter (SM),
Building Management System (BMS), Load Controller (LC),
Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE), etc. . . ) [3]. The
control Layer comprises a HMI (Human Machine Interface),
a server and a historian. The HMI provides an interface to
monitor MG operations. The historian is a database used to
store information and collected data for the functioning of
MG. The server comprises Supervisory Control And Data Ac-
quisition (SCADA) and Energy Management System (EMS).
Fig. 2: Microgrid Layered architecture
The control center is interconnected to MG components by a
communication layer through the intermediary of local con-
trollers. The communication network may be heterogeneous
using several technologies ranging from wired such as fiber-
optics, cables to wireless technologies [4], [5]. In addition
to the insider communication, MG control center should be
connected to utility grid, others adjacent MGS and internet to
accomplish optimal operations. For that, firewalls should be
used to protect the control center external communications.
III. MICROGRID THREAT LANDSCAPE
A threat landscape defines the list of potential threats and
threat agents against a considered system. A threat can result in
attacks whenever it exploits system vulnerabilities. As such, in
this section, we study the MG vulnerabilities, then we identify
potential threats and threat agents against MGS.
A. Microgrid Vulnerabilities
Although the integration of cyber systems into critical
physical infrastructures brings benefits, it introduces also a new
set of vulnerabilities that may expose the system to a variety
of threats. The exploitation of such cyber-vulnerabilities can
lead to physical consequences. MG, being a cyber-physical
system, inherits of their common cyber-vulnerabilities added
to vulnerabilities brought from the specificity of distributed
power systems. These vulnerabilities are created by:
• The use of Wireless communications. Although such
communication technologies bring several advantages to the
system, they introduce typical vulnerabilities because commu-
nications take place ”through the air” using radio frequencies
and thus it is difficult to prevent physical access to them,
especially in open and accessible areas like public power in-
frastructure. Risk of attacks such as interception and intrusion
is greater than with wired networks.
• The use of heterogeneous communication technologies.
Modern power systems are supposed to be handled by com-
munication networks using a variety of technologies. The co-
existence of different technologies either wired or wireless will
complicate the implementation of a robust and uniform cyber-
secure policy to protect the communication infrastructure.
• Increasing exposure to external networks. A MG should
continuously exchange data with the main grid operators and
other MGS at the aim to improve the overall performance
of the main grid and ensure the safety of its operations.
Such communications with other external networks exposes
the system to additional external threats.
• Exposure to Internet. Exchanging data with Internet is
essential for MG ancillary services such as weather forecast
data, fuel prices, etc, which exposes the MG to numerous
attacks conducted through Internet.
• Increasing system automation. Usually, automation control
is intended to improve flexibility and effectiveness of a system
operations by removing possibility of human error. However,
it introduces new vulnerabilities since more access points for
the system are available and therefore risk of attacks increases.
• Increasing use of distributed control and automation
devices. The sophisticated distributed control of flexible assets
and demand within a MG provide the promise of resilience;
however, the increased penetration of monitoring and control
capabilities open up the possibilities for breaches of security.
The digital era will extend and stretch MGs boundaries.
• Cohabitation between legacy and new systems. Since
power distribution grid is a shared common infrastructure used
by different distribution operators, MG controller is expected
to be continuously in contact with these operators in order
to improve the overall grid operations, the use of legacy
equipment and infrastructures introduces new vulnerabilities.
• Multiple independent systems. Power systems and in par-
ticular MGs are composed of diverse systems such as sensors,
actuators, computers, payment systems, emergency systems,
etc. It is crucial, but difficult, to ensure smooth interfacing,
communication and securing between such independent and
heterogeneous systems. This increases vulnerabilities.
As presented above, the nature of MG makes it severly
vulnerable. A vulnerability is considered as a weakness that
can be exploited by one or more threats [6]. Thus MGs are
increasingly exposed to cyber-physical threats. In the next
section, we identify potential threats for MGs.
B. Potential threats against Microgrid
In order to identify potential threats against MGS, we
choose to use the threat model of European Union Agency
for Network and Information Security (ENISA) [7]. This
model covers mainly cyber-security threats; which are threats
directly applied to ICT assets and thus affecting the system
operations. It also includes non-IT threats to cover threats to a
system physical assets that are necessary for main operations.
Based on this model, we identified a set of potential threats
that can endanger MGS. These threats can be classified into
the following categories:
• Physical attacks caused by intentional offensive actions
aiming to achieve maximum distraction, disruption,
destruction, theft or unauthorized access to MGS assets.
This category is not considered in the current analysis.
• Eavesdropping/Interception/Hijacking. This contains
cyber-attacks and intentional malicious activities or abuse
targeting digital assets of a system. Threats from this category
consist of altering communication between two parties without
installing additional tools/software on victim’s site .
• Nefarious Activities. This category also contains cyber-
attacks and intentional malicious activities or abuse targeting
digital assets of a system. However, these attacks usually
require the use of tools by the attacker. As such, the
threat is accomplished through the installation of additional
tools/software or performing additional steps on the victim’s
IT infrastructure/software.
C. Potential threat agents against Microgrid
Determination of the agent behind the attack may help to
identify the criticality of the attack. We distinguish 8 types of
threat agents:
• Corporations, organizations or enterprises that are en-
gaged in offensive tactics. In this context, they are considered
as hostile threat agents and their motivation is to build com-
petitive advantage over competitors. Depending on their size
and sector, corporations usually possess significant capabilities,
ranging from technology up to human engineering intelligence,
especially in their area of expertise.
• Cyber-criminals. Threat agents from this category are
hostile by nature. Moreover, their motivation is usually fi-
nancial gain and their skill level is, nowadays, quite high.
Cyber-criminals can be organized on a local, national or even
international level.
• Insider threat agents including employees and third party.
Employees refers to the staff, contractors, operational staff or
security guards working for the MG operator. Utilities rely
on vendors, system integrators, and other third party service
and product providers in order to operate their power facilities.
These threat agents can have insider access to private facilities
and resources of the MG, they also possess a significant
amount of knowledge that allows them to place effective
attacks against sensitive assets of the system.
• Hacktivists. This kind of threat agents are politically and
socially motivated individuals that use computer systems in
order to protest and promote their cause. Moreover, they are
usually targeting high profile websites, corporations, intelli-
gence agencies and military institutions.
• Nation states (NS) that have offensive cyber capabilities
and use them against an adversary. Nation states have recently
become a prominent threat agent due to the deployment of
sophisticated attacks that are considered as cyber weapons.
From the sophistication of these malware it can be confirmed
that nation states have a plethora of resources and they have
a high level of skills and expertise.
• Terrorists have expanded their activities and engage also in
cyber-attacks. Their motivation can be political or religious and
their capability varies from low to high. Preferred targets of
cyber terrorists are mostly critical infrastructures (e.g. public
health, energy production, telecommunication etc.), as their
failures causes severe impact in society and government.
• Cyber-fighters. This type of threat agents presents an emerg-
ing phenomenon, the profile consists of patriotic motivated
groups of citizens with the potential to launch cyber-attacks.
Such groups might have strong feelings when their political,
national or religious values seem to be threatened by another
group and are capable of launching cyber-attacks. Having said
that, one can argue that such groups are special cases (maybe
an evolution or yet another instance) of hacktivism. To an
extent, such groups may be supporters of totalitarian regimes
and, rightly or wrongly, act on behalf of their supporting parties
(i.e. governments) by contributing to national activities in the
cyber-space. Their activities may include conflicts with other
groups (i.e. hacktivists).
IV. CYBER-PHYSICAL THREAT ASSESSMENT
In this section, we perform a detailed threat analysis at
the aim to identify their impact on MG operations. We also
provide a first level of recovery, mitigation and good practices
to protect the system.
A. Physical threats
In this category of threats, the attacker aims to disturb the
cyber-system (including communication and control system)
through damaging or destroying physical assets of the system,
which lead to a partial or global dis-functioning of the system.
We describe in table I, the physical attacks that may be
performed against a MG control system and communication
assets.
TABLE I: Physical Threats
Threat Attack senarios Threat agents Assets
Sabotage
Vandalism
These threats may result of several attack sce-
narios aiming to disturb the MG operations by
destroying, damaging or obstructing physical
equipment from components, communication
and control layers.
Corporations
Cybercriminals
Hacktivists
NS
Employees
Terrorists
Central
control
system
Local
control
Comm
Theft Theft of devices/hardware Corporations
Employees
NS
Terrorists
Central
control
system
Local
control
Comm
Information
leakage
Confidential information about the MG oper-
ations or state can be shared with unautho-
rized entities due to intentional human actions
(mainly by employees that have access to
restricted facilities)
Corporations
Cybercriminals
Hacktivists
NS
Employees
Terrorists
Central
control
system
Local
control
Unauthorized
phys-
ical
access
Unauthorized
entry to
premises
An attacker could access to facilities that he
is not allowed to. E.g. he can access the set-
points in a power or voltage controller and at-
tempt to violate the limitation of safety thresh-
olds and thus damage equipment. He can also
access the energy manager and send malicious
commands to MG components which may
lead to several dysfunctions such as consum-
ing resources, or damaging components.
Employees
Hacktivists
Terrorists
Central
control
system
Physical attacks may result in damaging physical assets of
the control system of a MG including central control and
monitoring system, local control and monitoring equipment
and the communication infrastructure. Impacts severity of such
attacks varies depending on the degree of the damage and
the criticality of the assets damaged. In order to mitigate
physical attacks facing MGS, a physical security program
should be set up. A physical security program is a combination
of physical and procedural measures designed with the aim to
deter attackers, detect an occurring (or occurred) unauthorized
physical activity, delay an occurring attack by impeding the
adversary during and slowing his progress. This allows to
respond before attacked assets are compromised and take the
right measures once an attack or event has occurred in order
to prevent, resist or mitigate the attack and recover from the
incident and restore normal operations (as soon as possible).
The first protection technique comes from employees maintain-
ing a high level of security awareness. As such, employees
must be well formed about physical security policies and
procedures such as: types of threats to which the system is
exposed, degree of security of each asset, security responsibil-
ities in each work area and location, measures to take to protect
the system for each threat and attacker type, requirements to
report security issues or incidents in work areas, etc.
Another mandatory aspect to protect from physical threats
is access and physical entry control. In fact, access should
be controlled and/or restricted to system facilities for both
information and physical assets, especially for control center
facilities (server room, data-center, backup repositories and
storage area). This can be achieved through a mixture of
physical security measures such as monitored alarm systems,
closed circuit television (CCTV), access control systems, locks
and keying, guards and patrols, etc.
B. Unintentional data damage
This category covers mainly threats created by uninten-
tional staff members errors. According to [8], although data
damage incidents caused by errors has decreased ( from 32%
in 2015 to 17.5% in 2016) it is still the highest cause of data
damage incidents. We detail in Table II potential unintentional
employees errors that may threaten the functioning of a MG.
TABLE II: Unintentional data damage
Threat Attack scenarios Threat agents Assets
Erroneous
information
leakage
Confidential private or sensitive data can
be distributed or shared with unautho-
rized entities due to human errors, using
applications for mobile devices, web ap-
plication or by insecure network traffic
Employees All assets
Erroneous
use or ad-
ministration
of devices,
systems
Such threat may lead to errors in main-
tenance process, errors in configuration
and/or installation, technological obso-
lescence, unpatched software and in-
creasing recovery time.
Employees All assets
Usage of
information
from
unreliable
source
This may lead to bad decision in control
process, especially in critical situations,
based on unreliable sources of informa-
tion or unchecked information.
Employees Central
control
system
Local
control
Unintentional
alteration of
data
Loss of information integrity due to hu-
man error
Employees All assets
Inadequate
design,
planning,
adaptation
Threats caused by improperly IT As-
sets or business processes design (in-
adequate specifications of IT products,
inadequate usability, insecure interfaces,
policy/procedure flows, design errors)
Employees All assets
Unintentional threats may lead to sharing sensitive information
which results in loss of information confidentiality. They may
also endanger system integrity since they introduce software-
based vulnerabilities to the system. The best practice to de-
crease the occurrence of unintentional data damage incidents
resulted by unintentional employees errors is engaging in staff
training to increase the awareness about security issues facing
the system. Additional set of techniques should be imple-
mented in order to reduce the exposure of the system to such
threats, such as employing identity management systems and
advanced authentication techniques (to request additional Iden-
tification, authentication and authorization techniques when
modifying or discarding data), employing alarms to protect
digital assets (to setup additional alerting notifications and
alarms when modifying or discarding data), establishing re-
covery processes and maintain backups of the recorded data,
employing encryption for recorded data in order to limit the
impact of sharing it with unauthorized entities.
C. Eavesdropping, Interception, Hijacking
Eavesdropping attacks are insidious, because it’s difficult
to know they are occurring. Indeed, wireless communication
are insecure by nature due to the use of radio transmissions
which can be intercepted by anyone with an antenna, espe-
cially for the case of MG since the network is deployed in
public. As such, a combination of techniques are needed to
protect against and limit the impact of eavesdropping attacks.
These techniques comprise :- engage in staff training to rise
awareness and to learn about good practices concerning such
attacks, - employ encryption in order to protect data. In case
of eavesdropping attack, using strong encryption makes an
attacker’s mission far more difficult since he can not decode
data intercepted, - network segmentation by limiting access to
critical parts of the network, - the use of probes when designing
the network in order to detect such events, - physical security
is usually based on ”keep the bad guys away” philosophy. For
that, even if parts of MG communication network entities are
placed in public, limiting access to them may reduce some
types of eavesdropping attacks.
D. Nefarious Activities
The main target of attacks from this category is usually
the control and monitoring components. This can be done
using insecure exposure to the internet or the external network.
Attackers may uses vulnerabilities in all assets in order to
penetrate to the control center devices and as such he takes
control of the whole system. Such attacks may result in
catastrophic impacts on MG operations, but can also impact
other connected MGs or even the main grid. Using a highly
secure system by design is critical to defending against threats
listed in table IV. This is achieved by applying a set of security
techniques and policies including (but not limited to): - the
use of advanced authentication capabilities, e.g. multifactor au-
thentication, professional password-generating program, - the
establishment of a well-defined privilege rights management
system, restricting employees’ access to certain information
and allowing them to only perform specific functions, - the
implementation of a robust patch management program that
identifies vulnerable software applications and regularly up-
dates the software security to ensure ongoing protection from
known threats,- the implementation of a holistic approach to
data security and use preventative measures to ensure the
network security, - the use of firewalls and anti-virus software
to help identify and block potentially risky web pages, -
the use of anti-malware solutions, - the use of strategies for
botnet detection involve analyzing patterns of data sent over
the network, and monitoring computer resources usage and
external connections, - setting a configuration management
policy for connecting any hardware to the network. The
policy should specify security mechanisms and procedures for
various types of hardware, including computers, printers, and
networking devices, - implementing a Network Access Control
solution to enforce configuration policy requirements (e.g., by
automatically preventing network access to the devices that do
not comply with the network security policies), - implementing
a strict mobile device usage policy (data encryption, user
authentication, anti-malware solutions, etc).
All these techniques and policies should be coupled with
up-to-date periodic staff training in order to maximize the
effectiveness of the security solutions. As such, employees
should be aware about threats risking the system, especially
those resulting from their on-line bad habits. They should be
forbidden from accessing to social media websites while using
the system resources and equipment, they should learn about
the security threats generated by visiting these sites. In addition
to that, employees should be aware about social engineering
threats and educated on how to avoid being manipulated. And
TABLE III: Evesdropping/Interception/Hijacking
Threat Attack Scenarios Threat agents Assets
Wardriving Threat of searching, locating and possible exploitation of connection to wireless networks. The motivation
of such attack varies from performing it as a hobby, or to steal data and/or perform malicious activities, as
such the criticality of this threat depends of the type of threat agent performing the attack
comm
Intercepting compro-
mising emissions
Threat of disclosure transmitted information using interception and analysis of compromising emission Corporations, Cybercriminals,
Hacktivists, NS, Employees,
Terrorists
Comm
Interception of infor-
mation
Threat of interception of information improperly secured in transmission or improperly actions of staff.
Corporate espionage and unsecure Wi-Fi and rogue access point are examples of interception of information
attacks
Corporations, Cybercriminals,
Hacktivists, NS, Employees,
Terrorists
Comm
Interfering radiation Threat of failure of IT hardware or transmission connection due to electromagnetic induction or electromag-
netic radiation emitted from an another source
Corporations, NS, Terrorists Comm
Replay of messages Threat in which valid data transmission is maliciously or fraudulently repeated or delayed. For example,
an attacker may manipulate the incoming DR signals, they can be delayed or repeated, DR adherents may
receive these signal not in the right moment and response to the false event, which may cause instability of
the grid in addition to the financial impacts on both customers and (utility).
Cybercriminals, Employees,
Terrorists
Comm
Network reconnais-
sance and informa-
tion gathering
Threat of collecting information about network to identify security weaknesses Corporations, Cybercriminals,
Hacktivists, NS, Employees,
Terrorists
Comm
Man in the middle/
session hijacking
This type of attacks is a form of active eavesdropping in which an attacker makes independent connections
with the victims and relay or alters of communication between them. The attacker makes the victims thinking
that they are talking directly to each other over a private connection while he is controlling and manipulating
the whole communication process.
Corporations, Cybercriminals,
Hacktivists, NS, Employees,
Terrorists
Comm
Repudiation of ac-
tions
People, including public authorities, may modify data (such as AMI data) and thus refuse to acknowledge
an action that took place
Corporations, Cybercriminals,
Hacktivists, NS, Employees,
Terrorists
Comm
most important, they should learn about how to maintain the
security of their passwords. Other feature putting data at risk
and undermining the effectiveness of its IT operations is the
insufficiency or lack of a robust data backup and recovery
solution. As such, it is mandatory to establish a specified policy
defining procedures for data backup, storage, and retrieval. In
fact, data and system recovery capabilities allow to reduce
the risk of damage associated with a data breach. Thus, it is
essential to conduct routine backups of critical data and store
backup media in a safe and secure manner.
V. CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS
This paper presented an analysis of cyber-physical aspects
of MGS. In this analysis, we conducted a vulnerabilities
assessment, and we studied MG threat landscape by identi-
fying potential threats and threat agents that could endanger
MGS. Then, we performed a detailed cyber-physical threat
assessment at the aim of identifying their impacts on MGS. In
the future, we will continue exploring cyber-physical security
aspects of MGS, we intend to detail cyber-physical attack
scenarios and carry out simulations to quantify the impacts
of specific attacks on MG operations.
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TABLE IV: Nefarious Activities
Threat Attack Scenarios Threat agents Assets affected
Identity theft
(Identity Fraud/
Account)
Identity theft attacks by exploiting existing vulnerabilities, or using Trojans over private PCs. Once an
attacker steals identity of an employee or administrator, he gains high privileges in the system and access
to privileged data. As a result, he may take control of the system as such disturb the global functioning
of the MG. He may also change configuration or sensitive data to perform more sophisticated attack, for
example, he can leverage implementation weaknesses or lenient access control lists to elevate his privilege
level and abuse the new access rights gained as a result.
Corporations, Cybercriminals,
Hacktivists, NS, Employees,
Terrorists
All assets
Receive of unso-
licited E-mail
This can affect information security and efficiency of work (SPAM, unsolicited infected e-mails) Cybercriminals Central control
system
Denial of service
(DoS)
Threat of deny of service type attacks at information systems/services. In a DoS attack, a perpetrator uses a
single source connected to the network (or from the internet) to either exploit a software vulnerability or flood
a target with fake requestsusually in an attempt to exhaust system resources ( mainly the communication
network and the server). This type of attack can also be launched from multiple connected devices that are
distributed across the network (or from the internet), it is then called a distributed DoS (DDoS). This disturb
the communication network and probably makes it unavailable, as such it leads to prevention of authorized
access to multiple system resources or the delaying of system operations and functions. A of DoS attack
on network layer may, for example, result in blocking the incoming broadcast DR signals. A example of
DoS attack on application layer may consist of flooding the server at the control center with fake requests
leading to blocking the control system.
Cybercriminals
Hacktivists
Central control
system
communication
Malicious code/
software/ activity
Threat of malicious code or software execution including search Engine Poisoning, exploitation of fake trust
of social media, worms/ Trojans, mobile malware, alternation of software, infected trusted mobile apps,
elevation of privileges, phishing attacks, web injection attacks (Code injection: SQL, XSS), exploit Kits.
Using such type of attacks, an attacker can gain complete control of the system.
Corporations, Cybercriminals,
Hacktivists, NS, Employees,
Terrorists
Central control
system, Local
control system,
Social
engineering
attacks involve some form of psychological manipulation, fooling otherwise unsuspecting users or employees
into handing over confidential or sensitive data. Commonly, social engineering involves email or other
communication that invokes urgency, fear, or similar emotions in the victim, leading the victim to promptly
reveal sensitive information, click a malicious link, or open a malicious file. Because social engineering
involves a human element, preventing these attacks can be tricky for enterprises. Such attacks are performed
using malicious software such as : Rogue security software like Rogueware (a malicious software pretending
to detect and fix problems on victim’s computer, and uses this pretense to convince the victim to provide
money or install more malware), Scareware (a malicious software meant to raise uncertainty or to scare a
victim, its purpose is to make the victims feel threatened of imminent (unreal) danger and to make them
pay to eliminate it), Ransomware (a malicious software used by a hackers to take control of a computer
system and block access to it until a ransom is paid)
Cybercriminals
Hacktivists
Central control
system
Abuse of infor-
mation leakage
Leakage affecting mobile privacy and mobile applications, leakage affecting web privacy and web
applications, leakage affecting network traffic
Corporations, Cybercriminals,
Hacktivists, NS, Employees
Central control
system
Generation and
use of rogue
certificates
Loss of (integrity of) sensitive information, man in the middle/ Session hijacking, Social Engineering /
signed malware (e.g. install fake trust OS updates)
Corporations, Cybercriminals,
Hacktivists, NS, Employees
Central control
system
Manipulation of
hardware and
software
Threat of unauthorized manipulation of hardware and software such as anonymous proxies, abuse of 0-
day vulnerabilities (0-day vulnerabilities are vulnerabilities that are not publicly reported or announced
before becoming active. Such attacks consists of exploiting a software vulnerability before the software
owner becomes aware of it and before the vulnerability becomes widely known to the internet security
community, this makes these attacks are among the hardest to mitigate and leave computer systems and
networks extremely vulnerable), access of web sites through chains of HTTP Proxies (Obfuscation), access
to device software, alternation of software, rogue hardware
Corporations
Cybercriminals
Hacktivists
NS
Employees
All assets
Manipulation of
information
Threat of intentional data manipulation to mislead information systems or somebody or to cover other
nefarious activities (loss of integrity of information), falsification of records
Corporations, Cybercriminals,
Hacktivists, NS, Employees
All assets
Misuse of audit
tools
Threat of nefarious actions with use of audit tools (discovery security weaknesses in information systems) Corporations, Cybercriminals,
Hacktivists, NS, Employees
All assets
Unauthorized ac-
tivities
including unauthorized use or administration of devices and systems, unauthorized access to the information
system or network, unauthorized installation or use of software
Corporations, Cybercriminals,
Hacktivists, NS, Employees
All assets
Compromising
confidential
information
Threat of data breach Corporations, Cybercriminals,
Hacktivists, NS, Employees
All assets
Hoax Threat of disruption of work due to false rumor and/or a fake warning Corporations, Cybercriminals,
Hacktivists, NS, Employees,
Terrorists
Central control
system
Badware Spyware (a malicious software installed on a victim’s computer to collect information or monitor his
activities) or deceptive adware (advertising-supported software)
Corporations, Cybercriminals,
NS
Central control
system
Remote activity
(execution)
Threat of remote activities over controlled IT assets such as remote command execution, Botnets (Botnets
are networks of compromised computers used by hackers for malicious purposes)
Corporations, Cybercriminals,
Hacktivists, NS, Employees,
Terrorists
Central control
system
Targeted attack Threat of sophisticated targeted attack with combination of many attack techniques Corporations, Cybercriminals,
NS
All assets
